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 1. Introduction  
1.1 Theme and problem statement 
Over the past two decades the global agri-food procurement systems have undergone dramatic 
changes due to various factors including market liberalization, globalization and the 
internationalization of the food retail sector.  These transformations have created unprecedented 
opportunities and threats to agricultural producers and small and medium sized enterprises 
throughout the international agri-food supply chain (Boselie & Van de Kop, 2004; Shepherd, 
2007).  Many chain participants in developing countries were able to adjust to these changes.  
However not all the actors along the supply chain have access to the necessary resources, 
competencies or capacity to respond appropriately to presented opportunities and threats.  This is 
especially true for small-scale agricultural producers in developing and transition countries who 
due to the technological, financial, and institutional constraints are exposed to the risk of being 
permanently excluded from agri-food procurement systems (Dries & Swinnen, 2004); Dries et al, 
2004; Dries and Reardon, 2005). 
 
Governments and international development community have recognized the need for assistance 
programs designed to link farmers to markets.  Consequently, they are shifting their efforts from 
traditional technology push assistance approach towards programs focused on linking farmers to 
markets through high value added contractual marketing relationships (World Bank, 2008; 2002; 
USAID, 2004).   This shift has however provided an immense challenge.  The design, 
implementation and delivery of market driven development is substantially more complex and 
requires a completely different set of competencies and metrics for measuring delivery success 
and impact compared to traditional technology transfer and capacity building approaches.  New 
agri-food systems require new models of governance structures and channel coordination and 
therefore new models of facilitation of marketing linkages between producers and processors. 
 
Assistance programs designed to promote development of producer organizations and contract 
farming are among some of the most commonly discussed approaches for linking farmers to 
markets.  Research shows that marketing cooperatives can provide effective mechanisms for 
linking small farmers to formal markets, as they can reduce transaction costs through economies 
of scale in collection, transportation and extension, and simplify information flow between 
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Holloway et al, 2000).  Their long-term success has however been limited as their failure rate is 
often high due to free-rider problems, insufficient trust and conflicts over governance structures, 
and influence cost problems.  Ad hoc estimates within the development community indicate that 
the long run failure rate of marketing cooperatives is very high (Shepherd, 2007).  Non 
Governmental Agencies (NGO) were shown to have positive effects on creating market linkages 
through contract farming in developing countries by facilitating relationships between firms and 
farmers, providing technical assistance, and helping with input purchases (Porter & Philips-
Howard, 1997; Glover & Kusterer, 1990).  However the experience shows that the withdrawal of 
NGO services very often results in a collapse of those market linkages.  Among the main reasons 
for high failure rate are inappropriate business models, artificial incentive structures, and absence 
of contract enforcement mechanisms (Shepherd, 2007). 
 
The presence of effective contract enforcement mechanisms is one of the critical pre-conditions 
for establishing economically sustainable value chain linkages.  Public institutions play an 
important role in providing such mechanisms (North, 1990).  However, in many developing and 
transition economies public institutions are either weak or undergoing reforms and often 
ineffective in enforcing contractual relationships (Gow & Swinnen, 2001).  Moreover, relying 
solely on contract laws and using court for enforcing relationships proved to be ineffective when 
dealing with large number of small-scale resource constrained farmers in developing and 
transition economies (Shepherd, 2007).  The literature on transaction cost economics and game 
theory emphasizes the role of private contract enforcement mechanisms based on mutual 
dependence and reputation for ensuring reliable business relationships (Kreps et al, 1982; 
Macaulay, 1963; Williamson, 1985, 1998).  Recent empirical evidence from Central and Eastern 
European Countries shows that the foreign direct investment (FDI) and the entry of multinational 
enterprises (MNE) provided sufficient capital and reputation to establish private contract 
enforcement mechanisms and ensure productive contractual relationships between producers and 
processors in the absence of effective public enforcement (Dries & Swinnen, 2004; Gow & 
Swinnen, 2001; Gow & Swinnen, 1998).  Due to a number of reasons, however, for many 
developing and transition countries FDI and MNE are not an option.  Moreover, the domestic 
private sector in those countries has limited reputation and is lacking necessary resources for 
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private contract enforcement is poor resulting in high hold-up risk and underinvestment into 
relationships by actors.  
 
The absence of contract enforcement creates an immense challenge for donors and policy makers 
in facilitating sustainable relationships along the supply chain.  Firstly, it is difficult to engage 
parties into relationships due to distrust and unwillingness to invest.  Secondly, even if the 
relationships are developed they are not sustainable and are likely to fail even with the smallest 
changes in market conditions.  In many cases once the assistance project or external funding is 
over the linkages are breaking down due to nonperformance of parties (Shepherd, 2007).  The 
big challenge for governments, development organizations, and NGO’s is to design assistance 
programs that can address the problem of missing contract enforcement mechanisms and lead to 
self-enforcing, long-term sustainable linkages. 
 
The international agribusiness research and agricultural development literature are beginning to 
explore the appropriate structures of third-party facilitated market linkage programs that involve 
various contractual and institutional arrangements within environments with weak public 
enforcement mechanisms.  However limited research is currently available to provide strategic 
solutions that international agencies can use to externally facilitate the establishment of private 
enforcement mechanisms and improve long-term sustainability of contractual relationships 
between small-scale, limited-resource, financially-distressed, producers and local, regional and 
international markets.  Even though large number of market linkage facilitation programs has 
been implemented the lessons are not well disseminated (Shepherd, 2007).  It is important to 
analyze practical cases and identify strategies that proved to be effective in facilitating 
alternative contract enforcement mechanisms where the public enforcement is ineffective. 
 
1.2 Objective and methods 
This study explores the key elements in the design and implementation of assistance programs 
that could stimulate development of private contract enforcement mechanisms and improve 
sustainability of market linkages where the public enforcement is inadequate and the FDI is not 
present.  More specifically, we are interested in identifying strategies that can be used by a third-
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contractual arrangements between parties along the supply chain.   The major emphasis is placed 
on the role that a third-party external facilitator can play in assisting producers and processors to 
develop “internal” private enforcement mechanisms for ensuring efficiency and reliability in 
their business relationships.   In doing so, we make an important distinction between third-party 
enforcement of contracts and third-party facilitation of self-enforcing contractual relationships. 
 
We base our analysis on the probabilistic hold-up framework that Klein (1996) introduced to 
analyze the complementarity between public and private contract enforcement mechanisms and 
the role of private enforcement capital in explaining contractual arrangements adopted by 
transactors in the marketplace.  Gow, Streeter and Swinnen (2000) used this framework to 
illustrate how the FDI induced investments in “internal” private enforcement mechanisms can 
succeed where public enforcement fails.  In this paper we use the probabilistic hold-up 
framework to develop a theoretic model for third-party facilitation of investments in private 
enforcement mechanisms by processors and producers in an environment where private 
enforcement is poor and FDI is not present.  We introduce a general hypothesis that the 
establishment of self-enforcing relationships can be facilitated by a third-party through design 
and implementation of assistance programs that stimulate investments in and rearrangement of 
private enforcement capital by transacting parties.  The question we ask is: what are the key 
components in third-party market linkage facilitation strategy that could lead to investments in 
and rearrangement of private enforcement capital?  To answer this question and to establish an 
empirical framework for testing our hypothesis we examine the case of USDA Marketing 
Assistance Program in Armenian dairy sector.  
 
We use the USDA Marketing Assistance Program (MAP) in the Armenian dairy industry as an 
instrumental case for examining third-party facilitation strategies for linking producers to 
markets in the absence of adequate public and private contract enforcement.  Through an 
integrated market driven approach encompassing marketing, financial, and technical assistance 
USDA MAP was able to facilitate investments in private enforcement capital on both processing 
and farm levels.  As a result, many dairy farmers gained access to formal marketing channels and 
became engaged in procurement relationships with processors.  We use the data from an 
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dairy producing regions of Armenia to examine the relationship between the degree of private 
enforcement capital, level of trust, contract structures, marketing channel structure, and the 
extent of hold-up problems.   
 
Our findings indicate that incorporation of strategies that stimulate development of private 
enforcement mechanisms in the design and implementation of market linkage programs by donor 
and development agencies can lead to establishment of self-enforced supply chain relationships 
and a higher likelihood of long run economic sustainability, hence higher program impact for 
their constituents. These findings have important implications for policy makers and 
international development community.  A better understanding of third-party facilitation 
strategies of promoting contract enforcement mechanisms will help to design policies and 
foreign assistance programs that are more effective in linking producers to markets.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as following: Section 2 presents the conceptual framework, 
followed by Section 3 where we present the case of USDA Marketing Assistance Program in 
Armenian dairy industry.  The conclusions and implications are discussed in final Section 4.  
 
2.  Conceptual Framework  
2.1 Contract enforcement, hold-ups, and private enforcement capital 
One of the critical pre-conditions for establishing economically sustainable value chain linkages 
is the ability of actors along the supply chain to ensure certain degree of efficiency and 
predictability in their relationships.   The traditional view is that this can be achieved through 
public contract enforcement mechanisms supported by well functioning legal system and 
powerful state institutions (North, 1990).  However, the legal enforcement can become costly 
and not always feasible since all contracts are inherently incomplete and the performance is often 
unobservable and difficult to verify by third-party (Hart, 1995).  Contractual incompleteness 
combined with the presence of high uncertainty and opportunism often results in parties 
exposing themselves to the occurrence of hold-ups.  Hold-ups occur when one of the transacting 
parties attempts an ex-post renegotiation of the contractual understanding in order to extract the 
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& Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1998).  
 
The alternative view, embodied in transaction cost economics and game theory, is that the 
productive economic relationships can be established through “internal” private enforcement 
mechanisms by constructing mutual dependence and building reputation (Macaulay, 1963; Kreps 
et al., 1982; Willamson, 1985, 1998).  Klein (1996) introduced a probabilistic hold-up 
framework which implies a fundamental complementarity between public and private contract 
enforcement mechanisms.  He defined the self-enforcing range of contractual understanding and 
demonstrated how the presence of sufficient private enforcement capital can compensate for 
limitations of legal enforcement and lead to desired level of performance and long-term 
sustainability of business relationships (Klein, 1996).  This framework was used by Gow et al 
(2000) to illustrate how the FDI induced contract innovations and investments in “internal” 
private enforcement mechanisms resulted in “self-enforcing” relationships between suppliers and 
processors during transition in Central and Eastern Europe (Gow et al, 2000; Gow and Swinnen, 
2001).  We use the conceptual framework based on Klein’s model to analyze strategies for third-
party facilitation of sustainable market linkages through stimulation of investments in 
development and reallocation of private enforcement capital.  In this section we present a brief 
overview of the probabilistic hold-up model followed by the third-party facilitation strategy 
framework and the general hypothesis regarding the “external” facilitation of investments in 
“internal” private enforcement capital.   
 
2.2 Probabilistic hold-up model  
In his model Klein (1996) defines the self-enforcing range of contractual performance and 
illustrates how the presence of sufficient private enforcement capital can prevent hold-ups and 
lead to improved efficiency and reliability of business relationships.  The self-enforcing range 
measures the “extent to which market conditions can change without precipitating a hold-up by 
either party” (Klein, 1996 p 449).  It is determined by considering the degree of private 
enforcement capital of each party involved in transaction.  The degree of private enforcement 
capital can be defined by the magnitude of the losses from private sanctions that could be 
imposed on a transactor who attempts a hold-up.   Private sanctions include termination or non-
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losses associated with termination of the relationship are equal to the discounted value of the 
future quasi-rents from the relationship specific investments present in a transaction.   The 
damage of the reputation can impose additional costs on future transactions of the party that 
attempted hold-up due to distrust and unwillingness of others in the marketplace to engage into 
relationship.  
 
The hold-up potential can be affected by changes in market conditions which may alter the 
possible gains from breaching the contractual understanding.  When the changes in market 
conditions move the relationship outside the self-enforcing range so that one-time gain from 
hold-up exceeds the losses from private sanctions the hold-up treat will become credible.  
However, as long as the relationship remains within the self-enforcing range where each party’s 
gains from potential hold-up is less than the costs from private sanctions, a hold-up will not take 
place (Klein 1996).   
 
The concept of self-enforcing range can be illustrated by the following example adapted from 
Gow et al., (2000).  Assume a situation where firm A produces product x which can be used as 
an input by firm B to produce product y.  In order for firm B to procure x from firm A, firm A 
has to invest into production assets specific to the delivery to firm B.  In an attempt to prevent 
potential hold-up by firm B after firm A makes the specific investments, both firms agree on a 
contractual understanding which specifies quality, quantity and a fixed price for product x set at 
the expected market price  .  The ex post market price realization is denoted by  0 p p  and may 
deviate from ex ante expected price .  If  , the contract provides unanticipated rents to 
firm B and the potential benefits of breaching the contract for firm A since it could get a higher 
price by selling its product in the market.  Similarly if
0 p 0 p p >
0 p p < , firm A receives benefits from 
higher contractually agreed price and firm B has incentives to breach the contract and procure 
from the market at the lower price.   The difference between actual market price  p  and the 
contractual price   generates potential gains  0 p
j H for breaching the contractual understanding, 
with j=A, B.  As illustrated in Figure 1, at some   the benefits from breaching contractual 
understanding for firm A,   become larger than the costs , where  denotes the sum 




  8of losses from reputation damage and capital costs.  Similarly,  represents the market price 
below which firm B will have incentive to breach the contractual understanding and procure 
from the spot market.  As long as ex post market price is within  range, parties will have 
no incentive to breach the contractual understanding.  Thus   range defines the “self-











































Figure 1. The self-enforcing range of contractual understanding 
Adapted frm Gow et al., (2000) 
 
According to this framework, a hold-up will never occur if market conditions are fully 
anticipated.  If the ex-post market conditions and the resulting hold-up potential were anticipated 
by a transacting party it would not enter into the relationship or would insist on rearrangement of 
private enforcement capital so that the relationship stays within the self-enforcing range under 
anticipated market conditions.  However, at each point in time, parties only have an expectation 
on the future market conditions (for example price) and the resulting potential hold-up benefits.  
Figure 2 illustrates the expected probability distribution  of the hold-up benefits, which is  ( f
  9based on the underlying probability distribution of market price p .  When the actual price  p  is 
same as the ex ante expected price , the hold-up benefits are zero,  .  Given the 
costs   to firm A from breaching the contractual understanding, the probability of firm A 
breaching the contract can be defined by area  .  Similarly, the area   defines the probability 
of firm B holding-up the relationships given the costs   it will incur.  Consequently, under the 
presence of the private enforcement capital defined by the magnitude of  and  , the 
expected probability that the contractual understanding will be honored is   (Gow et al, 
2000). 

























Figure 2. The probability of contract self-enforcement 
Adapted from Gow et al., (2000) 
 
Based on this framework, the probability of contract self-enforcement can be increased by 
rearranging the private enforcement capital.  This can be achieved by enlarging the self-
enforcing range through investment in private enforcement capital by one or both parties.  
Alternatively, one party can finance other party’s investments into specific assets thus 
redistributing present enforcement capital from a party with a low hold-up potential to a party 
with higher hold-up potential.  In this regard contract terms can serve as means for economizing 
on the limited or unequal amounts of private enforcement capital of transacting parties, 
conditional on the presence of effective contract laws and public institutions.  If the adequate 
  10public enforcement is not present then the greater degree of investments in private enforcement 
capital will be required to ensure high probability of contract self-enforcement.  
 
Recent studies from Central and Eastern Europe provide empirical evidence in support of this 
framework and demonstrate how the foreign direct investment and the entry of multinational 
enterprises has led to rearrangement of private enforcement capital and improved efficiency of 
contractual relationships in the environment characterized by the absence or ineffectiveness of 
public enforcement institutions (Dries & Swinnen, 2004; Gow et al., 2000; Gow & Swinnen, 
2001; Gow & Swinnen, 1998).  In particular the study conducted by Gow et al (2000) illustrates 
how the FDI induced investments in “internal” private enforcement mechanisms resulted in 
“self-enforcing” relationships between suppliers and processors in Slovakian sugar industry.  In 
the case of Slovakia (similar to other cases from CEE) processor, powered by FDI, was the 
initiator of the process of building private enforcement capital through introduction of input 
provision and investment facilitation programs for its suppliers.  These investments expanded the 
self-enforcing range enough to compensate for the lack of effective public enforcement 
mechanisms (Gow et al., 2000). 
 
The underdeveloped and inefficient public institutions are common characteristic for many 
developing and transition countries.  Thus public mechanisms such as court enforcement are not 
a viable option to rely on for ensuring efficient contractual relationships between producers and 
processors in these countries. In CEE countries the role of FDI and MNE’s was critical for 
providing necessary resources and reputation to invest in private enforcement capital and solve a 
problem of contract enforcement.  However the FDI and MNE’s are not present in many 
countries due to number of reasons such as instable political-legal environment, high prevalence 
of corruption, unattractive domestic market, and high transaction costs associated with 
procurement.  For some of the same reasons the domestic private sector in those countries lacks 
resources to make investments necessary for ensuring effective private enforcement of 
contractual relationships with suppliers.  Without effective contract enforcement the economic 
transactions in many of these countries are limited to highly instable spot market option and the 
large number of agricultural producers is forced to resort to subsistence production.  
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farmers to markets becomes vital.   In the presence of inadequate public enforcement they may 
be able to compensate for the absence of FDI induced private enforcement through design and 
delivery of appropriate assistance programs.  In this paper we use the probabilistic hold-up 
framework to develop a theoretic model for third-party facilitation of investments in private 
enforcement mechanisms by processors and producers in an environment where private 
enforcement is poor and FDI is not present.  We introduce a general hypothesis that the 
establishment of self-enforcing relationships can be facilitated by a third-party through design 
and implementation of assistance programs that stimulate investments in and rearrangement of 
private enforcement capital by transacting parties.  Then the important question becomes: what 
are the key components in third-party market linkage facilitation strategy that could lead to 
investments in and rearrangement of private enforcement capital?  To answer this question and to 
establish an empirical framework for testing our hypothesis we examine the case of USDA 




3.1 Introduction and background  
Armenia has arguably faced one of the most difficult economic and social transitions of all the 
former Soviet Republics (World Bank, 2002).  Independence form Soviet Union, privatization, 
trade liberalization, war and resulting economic blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey had a 
combined impact of 60% decline in GDP between 1991-1993, and widespread poverty and 
financial distress.  The privatization in 1991 handed ownership and control of agricultural 
production to over 300,000 inexperienced and resource constrained household farmers.  The 
agroprocessing sector was privatized in the period of 1995-1996 through restitution to employees 
or direct sales to local buyers (FAO, 2000).  The traditional business practices were no longer 
appropriate due to broken business relationships, constrained trade and market access, limited 
capital, and a nonexistent legal enforcement system. The result was Armenian agri-food system 
in total disarray.  
  
  12By the mid 1990’s the traditional Armenian dairy sector had collapsed as well (World Bank, 
1995).  Dairy processors were constrained by poor quality milk supplies that arrived in 
inconsistent quantities, limited financial capital, inexperienced management stuck in a Soviet era 
mentality, poor sanitation, poor safety standards, and most importantly, inadequate or missing 
procurement relationships with farmers.  Processors where unable to extend trade credits to 
farmers; instead, they actually borrowed from farmers through extreme payment delays, 
worsening farmers’ already distressed cash flow situation. (Gow et al, 2006).  These problems 
forced processors to either close or severely reduce output resulting in a dramatic drop in 
capacity utilization.  At the farm level, transition had left farmers financially distressed, credit 
constrained and unprofitable due to increased input prices, decreased output prices, and limited 
market opportunities for selling their milk surplus.  Excess livestock were liquidated to access 
scarce capital resources and farmers retreated to subsistence agriculture and barter as a result. 
This adversely affected farmers’ production and investment incentives and resulted in a 
substantial drop in milk production.   The overall consequence was the significant disinvestment 
in assets by both processors and producers which reduced private enforcement capital and 
increased the probability of hold-ups within Armenian dairy industry.  Figure 3 illustrates the 
increased hold-up potential ( ) within Armenian dairy procurement channel resulted from 
decline in private enforcement capital of dairy processors and farmers denoted by   and   
respectively. 














Figure 3. The degree of private enforcement capital and resulting hold-up probability in 
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Until recently the Armenian agricultural sector had not experienced the economic recovery 
observed elsewhere in CEE.  Unlike other CEE countries, Armenia has not been able to rely on 
FDI to quickly restore an economically viable and sustainable market structure (World Bank, 
1995).  With its small domestic consumption base, both in terms of population and purchasing 
power, Armenia provided an unsuitable foreign investment location for multinational food 
companies.  Without the presence of FDI-induced private solutions that create self-enforcing 
relationships, encourage relationship specific investment, and drive diffusion of innovation (Gow 
et al, 2000), the Armenian agricultural sector remained in a sub-optimal equilibrium 
characterized by low quality output, delayed payments, deep financial distress and limited 
investment. There was a need for an alternative external stimulus.   
 
In 1992 Armenia requested USDA assistance in facilitating agricultural transition.  The USDA 
responded by providing a traditional extension-driven development assistance.  However, after 
three years of operation it was apparent that this production focus was not meeting industry 
needs.  So in 1996, a USDA advisory team redesigned the project from technology-push to 
market-pull and with that shifted the focus from farmers and production to market and business 
development. The result was the USDA Marketing Assistance Project.  Essentially, MAP 
changed the question from, “What can we produce?” to “what does the market demand and how 
can we link producers to markets?”(Cocks et al, 2003; Gow et al, 2009).   
 
3.2 USDA MAP facilitation of relationships between producers and processors 
USDA MAP market linkage facilitation activities in Armenian dairy industry began by strategic 
assistance aimed towards the processing sector knowing that farmers would benefit through 
backwards vertical spillovers.  The assistance included flexible and customizable package of 
financial, technical, and marketing assistance aimed at increasing production, improving product 
quality, and marketing.  Marketing assistance was focused on providing dairy processors with 
promotional assistance, trade show support, new product development and export assistance to 
access new markets.  As a result processors gained access to previously unavailable markets and 
recognized the potential of higher profits if they can serve these markets effectively.  Driven by 
this value proposition number of processors were motivated to invest in improving their 
  14procurement facilities and establishing relationships with milk producers.  Still only some of the 
processors were able to make necessary investment in procurement on their own, many of them 
were lacking necessary capital and competencies.  USDA MAP facilitated this process by 
providing financial and technical assistance directed on improving procurement channels.  In the 
design and delivery of financial assistance USDA MAP was careful to avoid creation of artificial 
incentives and dependence.  The financial assistance was provided predominantly through 
working capital loans and leases for capital assets such as pasteurizers, milk cooling tanks, and 
other equipment.  The technical assistance was directed towards improving both raw milk 
procurement and final product quality.  At the procurement level technical assistance helped 
processors and their farmer suppliers to establish contractual arrangements to improve quantity 
and quality of raw milk.  The result was a significant investment in raw milk procurement by 
dairy processors.  The examples included one of the largest dairy processor Ashtarak Kat which 
invested in building number of milk collection centers in ten regions of Armenia providing large 
number of farmers in remote villages with access to formal milk marketing channel.  Other 
processors invested in trucks for collecting and transporting milk.  These investments in relation 
specific assets effectively increased private capital of processors and reduced probability of 
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Figure 4. The investments in private enforcement capital by processors and 
the resulting decrease in hold-up probability  
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with processors; however they were short of resources to make necessary investments in order to 
meet increasing supply requirements.  Low quality and inconsistency of raw milk supply was 
still a source of treat to the relationship between processors and farmers.  
 
Recognizing this USDA MAP initiated the farmer assistance program in 1999 which included 
facilitation of establishment of milk marketing associations, microcredit program, and farm level 
technical assistance to improve cow genetics and management practices.  The central concept 
behind the formation of the associations was that they had to be driven by the villagers 
themselves and not dictated by a centralized governmental or aid agency plan.  Farmers needed 
to come together on the basis of common economic interests (Cocks et al., 2003).  Once 
established, a board of directors was elected who registered the association and negotiated a 
processor marketing contract.  It was important that the processor marketing relationship was 
established independent of USDA MAP to ensure long run sustainability.  Concurrently, a 
collection center was established.  The milk cooling tank was provided on a lease-to-buy 
agreement, interest free loan for the first six months while the association was getting 
established.  The milk cooling tank served two purposes; improving raw milk quality, and 
secondly, providing an initial capital gain for bringing villagers together to join the association 
(Cocks et al., 2003; Gow et al., 2009).   
 
To assist financially distressed small scale farmers with upgrading milk production and delivery 
the Agricultural Production Credit Club (APCC) microcredit program of USDA MAP was 
extended to dairy sector.   The program was providing small production loans to groups of ten to 
fifteen self-selected dairy farmers on a group liability basis (Gow et al, 2006).  Farmers were 
able to finance investments in increasing heard size and improving housing and sanitation.  
These were complimented by farm level technical assistance to improve heard genetics through 
implementation of artificial insemination.   
 
Through carefully designed farmer assistance program USDA MAP was able to provide dairy 
farmers with access to resources for upgrading their production without creating misaligned 
incentives and dependence culture.  As a result farmers were able to make investments in 
  16additional number of cows and increase milk production capacity.  In the context of the 
procurement relationships with processors these investments can be seen as dedicated assets that 
increased private enforcement capital of the farmers.   Figure 5 illustrates the increase in cost of 
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Figure 5. The investments in private enforcement capital by farmers and 
the resulting increase in relationship self-enforcement. 
 
The USDA MAP unique facilitation strategy initiated rapid revitalization of procurement 
relationships between processors and farmers within Armenian dairy sector.  Within the context 
of this case we hypothesize that the third party market linkage facilitation strategy pursued by 
USDA MAP stimulated investments in private enforcement capital by processors and producers 
and resulted in establishment of self-enforcing relationships between dairy farmers and 
processors based upon timely payment and cash-flow stream from processor to farmers, and a 
secure supply of high-quality milk from farmers to processors.  In this paper we establish an 
empirical framework for testing our hypothesis and provide some descriptive statistics on the 
relationship between USDA MAP programs and the degree of private enforcement capital, level 
of trust, contract structures, marketing channel structure, and the extent of hold-up problems 
between processors and farmers.  It is important to recognize that this is an exploratory study of 
the effects of third-third party facilitation strategies on investments in private enforcement capital 
and intends to provide ground for the development of relevant empirical model for future 
  17confirmatory research.  Therefore the objective of this study is not to prove causality and impact 
with a certain level of statistical accuracy but only to explore and identify the presence or 
absence of possible relationships between third-party facilitation strategies and rearrangement of 
private enforcement capital by actors to ensure self-enforcing contractual relationships. 
 
3.3 The data evidence 
The data used in this study was collected by the USDA MAP in 2004 as the part of the larger 
effort to conduct an impact assessment of the USDA MAP initiatives in four major sectors of 
Armenian agriculture.  A stratified random sampling frame was established to collect data on 
economic, financial, social stance of Armenian dairy farmers.  Thirty three villages in eight 
regions were selected for survey. The survey was conducted over the fall of 2004.  A total of 745 
farmers were surveyed within the dairy industry.  The survey was primarily cross-sectional, 
although some reflectionary questions were included regarding income, farm productivity, milk 
production, number of cows, and choice of marketing channel.  The survey included information 
on household demographics, income generation, asset ownership and investment, production, 
finance, land use, business relationships, and marketing channel structures. 
 
The data indicates that within the total sample about 71% of farmers were in subsistence 
production before 1999, with majority of produced milk going to household consumption and 
barter.  During USDA MAP facilitation in the period of 1999-2004 more than half of these 
formerly subsistence farmers entered into formal procurement relationships through milk 
marketing associations or direct sales to dairy processor.  The average number of cows per 
household in the total sample increased from 2.9 to 4.8 between 1996 and 2003.  For the farmers 
supplying formal marketing channel the average number of cows almost doubled, increasing 
from 3.2 cows in 1996 to 6 cows in 2004.  The average milk yield per cow was almost 20% 
higher for farmers supplying milk to processors compared to subsistence farmers.  These 
findings indicate investments in number and quality of cows by farmers who established 
procurement relationships with processors.  
 
Approximately 40% of farmers within formal procurement channel supplied on the basis of 
written contract, the rest of them supplied based on verbal arrangement.  Farmers who singed 
  18written contract mentioned guaranteed market for milk as a most common reason.  However 
41% of farmers who delivered based on verbal agreement indicated that the formal contracts 
provide no advantage. The most common contractual specifications included price, frequency of 
delivery and payment, and minimum quality requirements.  More than half of them had no 
specified penalties for breaking the contractual arrangement.  Over 90% of farmers said that their 
procurement partner never breached terms of contractual understanding.   Among farmers 
supplying dairy either directly or through cooperative approximately two thirds reported that 
they have received advanced payments for milk.   
 
Two third of the farmers linked to markets reported strong trust towards their procurement 
partner measured on the seven-point Likert scale.  Approximately same number of farmers 
indicated that their trust increased within past two years (2002-2004). The average percent of 
household income from dairy operations in 2003 for the farmers linked to formal marketing 
channel was 50% higher compared to farmers with no access to formal marketing channels.   
 
Although these results are purely descriptive, they provide a starting point for understanding the 
possible relationships between third-party facilitation strategy implemented by USDA MAP and 
development of self-enforcing contractual arrangements between processors and farmers within 
Armenian dairy industry.   Further econometric analysis of the data is required to test the impact 
of specific strategy components such as integrated concurrent marketing, financial, and technical 
assistance by USDA MAP and investments in physical and dedicated assets such as collection 
centers and cows by processor and farmers respectively.  As well as the impact of these 
investments on the degree of contractual specifications, hold-ups, and trust among transacting 
parties.  In order to test long-term sustainability of established marketing linkages the follow-up 
survey of the farmers in the 2004 sample was implemented in 2009 by the authors.  This will 
provide additional empirical base for a further analysis of third-party facilitation strategies and 
models for “external” stimulation of “internal” private enforcement mechanisms in the 
environments with inadequate public enforcement and limited FDI.   Further research plans also 
include comparative studies across different value chains and country settings.  
 
  194. Conclusions and Implications 
The results of our study indicate that the USDA MAP facilitated investments into collection 
centers by processors and the establishment of milk marketing associations led to high 
investment response by farmers in the number and quality of cows.  These investments into 
relationship specific assets on the processing and farm level resulted in improved trust and lower 
extent of hold-ups (instances of late payments by processors and side-selling by farmers) while 
contract specifications were minimal and transactions were often based on verbal agreements.  
The results indicate that donor and development agencies that pursue strategies to stimulate 
private enforcement capital in the design and implementation of market linkage programs can 
lead to self-enforced supply chain relationships and a higher likelihood of long run economic 
sustainability, hence higher program impact for their constituents. These findings have important 
implications for policy makers and international development community.  A better 
understanding of third-party facilitation strategies of promoting contract enforcement 
mechanisms will help to design policies and foreign assistance programs that are more effective 
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